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as the scientific evidence of global climate change continues to accumulate (IPCC, 007) 
and the predicted impacts of a warming planet become more widely known, national 
policies and international agreements designed to mitigate global warming have sought to 
strike a balance between environmental sustainability and economic achievement. Under 
the 997 Kyoto accord (hereafter “Kyoto”) a global framework for reducing greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions to pre-990 levels was developed that established binding emissions 
reduction targets and timetables for industrialized countries, and included flexibility 
provisions intended to reduce the overall cost of emissions reductions. Countries subject 
to emissions limits were free to decide how to reduce emissions to meet the established 
targets over the period 008–0. Countries could design their own domestic policies to 
meet their targets. Kyoto’s flexibility provisions allowed cooperation between industrialized 
countries to achieve emissions reductions through Joint Implementation and included 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to facilitate cooperation with developing 
nations that were not subject to binding emissions reductions. Despite the fact that not 
all countries ratified the 997 agreement, many countries, provinces, and states have, in 
the time since Kyoto, enacted policies individually or in cooperation to reduce GHG 
emissions. In addition to binding regulatory approaches taken by governments there has 
also been at least one similar voluntary initiative undertaken by the private sector in the 
form of the Chicago Climate exchange.
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Cap and trade
economists have taken a strong interest in helping governments to evaluate various policy 
instruments to achieve emissions reductions. on the basis of the success of the United 
States’ sulfur dioxide (So) emissions trading program and a large body of scientific re-
search on regulatory standards, emissions taxes, and tradable pollution permits (Hanley et 
al., 007), policy designs that establish enforceable property rights to verifiable quantities 
of emissions, which are transferable between parties, have been pursued most frequently 
and are the focus of the majority of ongoing national and international policy debates. 
This type of policy design is commonly referred to as “cap and trade” because the govern-
ment establishes a “cap” on total emissions, allocates permits that constitute individual 
property rights to emit an allowable quantity of a pollutant, and allows firms to trade 
these “allowances.”  an allowance typically entitles its owner to one metric ton (tonne) 
of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCoe) emissions. The total emissions cap is expressed in 
terms of millions of tCoe (MtCoe) and the sum of all individual allowances equals 
the emissions cap or target.
each firm subject to the emissions cap must have allowances to cover their total level 
of emissions or they are subject to fines or other penalties enforced by the government. to 
achieve required emissions reductions, a firm must either reduce its emissions or acquire 
allowances to cover its total emissions. firms can reduce their own emissions by reducing 
output, operating more efficiently, and/or by investing in less C-intensive technologies. 
These options can become very expensive for anything more than modest reductions in 
emissions. Because different firms operating in many sectors of the economy use different 
technologies, they have different GHG abatement costs and there are potentially signifi-
cant gains from trade if regulated firms are allowed to exchange emissions allowances in 
a market. By allowing firms to trade allowances, those with the lowest abatement costs 
can abate more pollution than required and sell excess allowances to firms with higher 
abatement costs. This allows society to achieve the desired environmental objective at 
a lower total cost than if all firms were only allowed to generate emissions equal to the 
amount of allowances they hold (whether grandfathered or auctioned to them) and no 
trade of allowances were allowed. 
all else equal, a more stringent emissions cap will place greater pressure on all firms 
operating under the cap and is expected to result in greater demand in the market for 
allowances; this will have the effect of driving up the market price of allowances and, 
thus, firm compliance costs. Many factors in cap-and-trade program design can influence 
the overall cost to society.  Including mechanisms that give firms time to develop and 
transition to less C-intensive technologies and energy sources reduces the overall cost 
while increasing the political feasibility of a cap-and-trade policy. typical mechanisms 
that achieve this include phasing-in a cap through gradual reductions over several years, 
1one of the most notable factors that determines the overall cost of a cap and trade program is whether 
 allowances are freely allocated or auctioned to firms (Burtraw et al., 00). This topic is outside the scope of 
the current paper.
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allowing firms to “bank” low-cost emissions reductions achieved in early years to be used 
to meet more stringent reduction requirements in the future, and allowing regulated 
firms to pay for GHG emissions reductions by unregulated sources that have the effect 
of offsetting emissions released by the regulated firm. The third of these mechanisms is 
called an emissions offset, and is the focus of the remainder of this paper.
agriculture and forestry are two of the most commonly considered sources of offsets 
in an emissions trading market because these sectors of the economy are not directly 
regulated and have the potential to adjust management practices in ways that sequester 
additional C or otherwise reduce emissions of the GHGs methane (CH4) and nitrous 
oxide (no) (IPCC, 007; ePa, 005). Discussion of forestry offsets is left to other 
authors and agricultural offsets are the focus of what follows. The remainder of this pa-
per discusses potential sources of GHG-emissions offsets that represent opportunities for 
agriculture under policies that seek to limit global warming and the scientific and policy 
challenges that must be addressed in order for agricultural offsets to be an effective tool 
in mitigating human impacts on climate.
offsets as opportunities for agriculture
The three main GHGs that can be mitigated through agricultural activities are Co, CH4 
and no. agricultural management practices can be altered or changed in many ways 
to reduce emissions from existing practices, to enhance the removal of Co from the 
atmosphere (C sequestration), or to displace emissions from fossil fuels by using crops 
or residues as sources of energy (IPCC, 007). Displaced fossil fuel emissions from bio-
energy crops represent an important opportunity for agriculture and remain a fertile topic 
for research as governments continue to rely on renewable fuel standards as an important 
component of energy and climate change policies. fossil fuel emissions displaced are not 
treated as a source of offsets under cap-and-trade policies and we turn our attention to 
the biophysical and economic potential of reduced emissions from current practices and 
sequestration.
reduced or more precise application of nitrogen (n) fertilizer or livestock manure can 
reduce no emissions if greater n-use efficiency can be achieved. Methane emissions 
from livestock can be reduced by improving feeding and manure management practices 
(e.g. by covering lagoons or capturing CH4 through use of anaerobic digesters). Increased 
feeding efficiency can be achieved through the use of dietary additives that suppress metha-
nogenesis or improved forages, and opportunities for manure management, treatment 
and storage that reduce CH4 emissions both represent mitigation options in livestock 
management (IPCC, 007; Smith et al., 008). atmospheric C can be sequestered in 
the soil and in vegetation. Soil management practices that increase sequestration include 
conservation tillage (e.g. mulch till, ridge till and no till) and crop residue management 
(Lal et al., 998). vegetative C storage can be enhanced through perennial grass plantings 
and grazing management (follett et al., 000). although existing agricultural practices 
already play a role in mitigating the global warming effect of some fossil fuel emissions 
that result from fertilizer production and fuel use, there is considerable potential to 
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expand and improve upon existing practices. This potential for wider use of mitigating 
practices is what creates the opportunity for farmers to sell emissions offsets in a market 
for Co-equivalent emissions.
an important aspect to keep in mind when evaluating different mitigation options is 
the distinction between the technical potential and the economic potential that individual 
agricultural practices represent (McCarl and Schneider, 00; Smith et al., 008). techni-
cal potential refers to the biophysical ability of various management practices to reduce 
emissions, but does not take into account the cost-effectiveness of the same practices. 
In moving from the science of C sequestration and CH4 capture to thinking about the 
adoption of new cropping or manure management systems, it is necessary to take into 
account whether there are adequate incentives for farmers to adopt mitigating practices. 
we can expect farmers to adopt these practices only if the costs of implementation are 
covered by the benefits received. 
Under a cap-and-trade program, farmers can sell offsets to regulated emissions sources 
to cover the cost of these practices, but economic analysis of cap-and-trade policies to 
date suggests that, even at the highest prices per tCoe considered, only a subset of the 
mitigation options that have technical potential are economically feasible (McCarl and 
Schneider, 00; ePa, 005; Smith et al., 008). The global technical mitigation potential 
by agriculture in 030 has been estimated to be as high as ~5,500 to 6,000 MtCoe/year; 
this is in contrast to the global economic potential, which has been estimated for the same 
year to be as low as ,500 MtCoe/year for a carbon price of US$0/tCoe and as high 
as 4,300 MtCoe/year for a price of US$00/tCoe (Smith et al., 007). 
It is also important to consider non-agricultural sources of offsets like forestry and 
landfill gas when assessing the potential role of agricultural offsets. The economic analysis 
done by the US environmental Protection agency (ePa) (005) to assess the domestic 
C-sequestration potential of forestry and agriculture found that for market prices over 
US$30/tCoe, the economic incentives are such that crop and pasture lands are expected 
to be converted to forests because the sequestration potential of forest exceeds soil-C 
sequestration and high prices cover the cost of land-use conversion. over the higher 
range of prices considered, agricultural soil C has lower relative economic potential 
than afforestation. This is one illustration of why agriculture should not be analyzed in 
isolation from other sectors that can supply offsets. It is also important to consider both 
domestic and international sources of offsets (if available) because the demand side of 
the market is seeking to minimize its cost of compliance and it stands to reason that if 
country “a” can supply the offsets needed for compliance at a lower cost than country 
“B,” the lowest-cost source of abatement will be exhausted before firms consider paying 
for higher-cost alternatives.
The main economic motivation for including offsets as part of a cap-and-trade policy 
to reduce GHG emissions is to reduce the overall cost of achieving the emissions target 
or cap. economic analysis of cap-and-trade legislation is perhaps the best place to look 
to see the estimated effect of including offsets on the cost of allowances, and thus the 
overall cost of achieving a GHG emissions target. recent analysis of the draft american 
Clean energy and Security act of 009 (H.r. 454) by the United States Congressional 
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Budget office found that the inclusion of both domestic and international offsets has 
“a significant effect on allowance prices” and decreases the market price 69% in 0 
to US$35 compared to when offsets are not a compliance option under the legislation 
(CBo, 009, p. 6). The ePa’s economic analysis of the same legislation similarly found 
that “offsets have a strong impact on cost containment” and that “without international 
offsets, the allowance price would increase 96%” to US$5–34 in 05 (ePa, 009a, p. 
3). Both analyses of the most recent federal cap-and-trade legislation in the United States 
illustrate how incorporating offsets into a cap-and-trade program may influence the cost 
of climate change mitigation.
Scientific research has demonstrated many opportunities for agriculture to supply 
emissions offsets in a market for GHG emissions, but researchers and policymakers 
must always be mindful of the relative abatement cost of alternative sources of both 
domestic and international offsets when evaluating different policy designs. The market 
price of allowances will ultimately determine how big a role agricultural offsets will play 
in emerging markets. 
Scientific and Policy Challenges to offset effectiveness
The fact that science has demonstrated the potential for agriculture to provide emis-
sions offsets under a cap-and-trade program and that including offsets as part of policy 
design may significantly decrease the cost of such programs is not enough to ensure the 
environmental integrity of legislation or international agreements that aim to mitigate 
the effects of climate change. to focus readers’ attention on some of the most substantive 
issues that must be addressed in order for agricultural offsets to be an effective component 
of a regulatory (non-voluntary) cap-and-trade program, I will address four principal 
dimensions of policy design:
• verifiability,
• enforceability,
• additionality, and
• Permanence.
Verifiability
In order for agricultural offsets to be credible emissions reductions, they must be verifi-
able. There must be scientifically valid techniques or methods capable of quantifying the 
amount of actual emissions offset by every single individual management practice (e.g. 
no-till or livestock methane capture) that is allowed under the offset policy established by 
a cap-and-trade program. It must be possible to verify that practices have been installed 
on every single farm, and monitoring or auditing must occur to ensure that practices are 
implemented or maintained consistent with the protocol established for each practice. 
verifiability encompasses the technical ability to verify the amount of emissions that have 
been offset by a given practice and specific protocols must be established at the outset so 
that market participants know how quantification of Coe will be performed.
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verification will necessarily involve a third party that is not involved in the farm 
operation and is in no way associated with any entity serving as an aggregator of offsets 
undertaken by many individuals. Because maintaining an offset registry could potentially 
entail working with many tens of thousands of individual farmers located in many states 
or countries, many of the details involved in commoditizing the sequestered C or captured 
CH4 involve significant transaction costs that must be carefully managed in order for the 
operation of an offset registry to even be feasible. It is important to note that the cost of 
using third party services to audit management practices or coordinate large groups of 
farmers so that they can access the market must be borne by the parties involved and, 
when this cost is added to abatement cost for a specific practice, it increases the market 
price required to incentivize emissions offsetting practices. 
Enforceability
In order for emissions reductions to be credible, they must be enforceable. This means that 
legal contracts between farmers and the offset registry or third party aggregator must be 
established to clearly spell out the responsibility of all parties involved and the duration 
of the contract. It is likely that multi-year contracts will be required to entice farmers to 
change tillage practices, plant perennial grasses or make capital investments in manure-
handling or -treatment systems, and this is discussed further under the permanence 
dimension below. The consequences of violating the contract must also be clearly spelled 
out to ensure that emissions reduction obligations are fulfilled, otherwise the environ-
mental integrity of the cap-and-trade program could be called into question. 
enforceability may be a particularly important consideration for dealing with the in-
clusion of international offsets in a domestic cap-and-trade program. This may limit the 
ability of countries with particularly poor property rights or legal systems to participate 
in an emissions market if it is not feasible to enforce the provisions of the required con-
tract. to the extent that third parties can help to overcome this potential obstacle, greater 
cooperation between industrialized and developing countries like that envisioned by the 
CDM in the Kyoto Protocol will be possible. Because the marginal abatement costs for 
farmers in developing countries are considerably lower than for farmers in industrialized 
countries, international offsets typically play a disproportionately large role in reducing 
the overall cost of cap-and-trade programs, as detailed in analyses of the waxman-Markey 
cap-and-trade bill being considered currently by the th US Congress (CBo, 009; 
ePa, 009a)
Additionality
all agricultural practices adopted that offset GHG emissions must be in addition to any 
practices the farmer would have adopted in the absence of cap-and-trade legislation that 
would pay them for emissions they offset. The point of reference is some baseline level 
of “business as usual” activity and the way that such baselines are established must be 
determined ex ante. Dealing with additionality is one of the most difficult issues in the 
design of offset programs because a large number of farmers have already undertaken these 
practices for a variety of reasons that may or may not have included the potential to be 
85
paid for soil-C sequestration in the future. The 009 waxman-Markey legislation allows 
offset projects that exceed the activity baseline established and that were undertaken after 
January , 00, to be included if the offsets were registered under some other program 
recognized by the administrator of the ePa. 
additionality may ultimately lead to unintended consequences if the financial incen-
tives of being paid for offsets are great enough. Consider that under the US ePa’s revised 
[since ePa (005)] baseline emissions scenario used to analyze the draft waxman-Market 
bill there are already enough acres under conservation tillage that agricultural soil-C 
sequestration starts in 00 as a net C sink of 77 MtCoe compared with being a net 
source of 3 MtCoe when estimated in 005 (ePa, 009b). This represents a nearly 
00 MtCoe in emissions difference that is largely attributable to increased adoption of 
conservation-tillage practices. If these farmers were to plow up all of these acres after a 
cap-and-trade program is enacted, only to turn around the following year and re-establish 
their conservation tillage so that their practices are eligible to be compensated as offsets, 
this would release the vast majority of the sequestered C back into the atmosphere, thus 
negating any mitigation previously achieved. This seems like a potentially significant 
unintended consequence, but one that is altogether reasonable to expect if early adopters 
are not eligible to receive offset credits. This is related to the issue of permanence.
Permanence
Because some agricultural practices that offset GHG emissions are reversible, as is the case 
with soil-C sequestration, adoption may not represent permanent removal of the offset 
emissions as would be the case if a regulated source reduced its emissions by an equivalent 
amount. Permanence has been dealt with in many ways that include the provisions in the 
contract already described under the enforceability dimension that detail how reversion is 
handled. among other things, this may rely on offset credits placed into a “reserve pool” 
when offsets are credited to farmers based on the GHG and practice adopted. This practice 
has been used by the Chicago Climate exchange (www.theccx.com) and the government of 
alberta (www.carbonoffsetsolutions.ca) in issuing the only such agricultural offset credits 
awarded through functioning emissions markets to date. emissions offset by agricultural 
practices may be discounted so that the number of marketable credits generated is less 
than the estimated amount of sequestration that occurs to account for the frequency of 
reversion among certain practices. for example,  tCoe may be placed into the reserve 
pool for every 5 tCoe sequestered so that for every 5 metric tons removed from the 
atmosphere, farmers are eligible to sell 4 tCoe. This discounting or credit-issuance rate 
is done to address permanence and the reserve pool that can be drawn on to maintain 
the overall environmental performance of the emissions market. 
Permanence is a key reason why agricultural offsets are often viewed as a tool to bridge 
the gap between the present and the time when new technologies and fuel sources can be 
developed that achieve emissions reductions that are not subject to the same challenges. By 
lowering the cost of reducing emissions in the near term, offsets can help reduce the overall 
cost to society of transitioning away from fossil fuels and developing new technologies.
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